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a Taking?
For this nation’s justice system to work effectively, “it is nec-essary that all  relevant evidence be available” to the liti-
gants.1  To that end, “‘[t]he public has . . . a right to every man’s
evidence,’ except for those persons protected by a constitutional,
common-law, or statutory privilege.”2  A general duty exists re-
quiring citizens to provide evidence when justice demands it;
privileges are the exception to this general duty.3
The vehicle for compelling witnesses to provide their testi-
mony is the subpoena.4  Attorneys are given wide latitude in issu-
ing subpoenas and, therefore, the process is subject to abuse.5
One common type of misuse is the subpoenaing of a non-party
expert to testify without paying expert fees.6  Compelling an ex-
pert to testify can jeopardize the expert’s economic interests be-
* Candidate for J.D., University of Oregon School of Law, 2005.  Associate Edi-
tor, Oregon Law Review , 2004-05.  The Author wishes to thank Professor Keith
Aoki for his patient guidance and thoughtful insight, Jessica King and Justin Racette
for their thoughtful revisions, and his parents, George and Joyce Bagnall, for their
never-ending love and support.
1 Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 873 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
2 Id.  (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1973)).
3 Wright , 547 F. Supp at 875.
4 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2451, at 15 (2d ed. 1995).
5 Id.  § 2463, at 68.
6 Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Novo Nordisk Pharm., Inc., No. 02-235-SLR, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7911, at *8 (D. Del. 2003).
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cause it denies him the opportunity to bargain for the sale of his
services and is arguably a taking of the expert’s intellectual
property.7
This method of abuse was specifically addressed in the 1991
amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when sub-
section (c) was added to Rule 45.8  Rule 45(c)(3) is split into two
main subsections, (A) and (B).9  The former lists situations in
which a court must  quash a subpoena, and the latter indicates
situations in which a court should  quash one.10  At issue in this
Comment is Rule 45(c)(3)(B)(ii), which states that a subpoena
should be quashed if it “requires disclosure of an unretained ex-
pert’s opinion or information not describing specific events or oc-
currences in dispute and resulting from the expert’s study made
not at the request of any party.”11
An unretained expert witness is not, however, protected abso-
lutely by Rule 45(c)(3)(B)(ii).12  The final sentence of Rule
45(c)(3)(B)(iii) allows the party seeking the discovery to prevail
if it is able to (1) show a substantial need for testimony that can-
not be gathered elsewhere without undue hardship; and (2) as-
sure that the witness will be “reasonably compensated.”13  In
assessing whether a request to compel testimony should be
granted, the court should consider the Kaufman v. Edelstein  bal-
ancing factors which include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(1) [T]he degree to which the expert is being called because of
his knowledge of facts relevant to the case rather than in order
to give opinion testimony; (2) the difference between testify-
ing to a previously formed or expressed opinion and forming a
new one; (3) the possibility that, for other reasons, the witness
is a unique expert; (4) the extent to which the calling party is
able to show the unlikelihood that any comparable witness
will willingly testify; and (5) the degree to which the witness is
7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra  note 4, § 2463, at 76-77.
8 Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7911 at *8.  Prior to the 1991
Amendments, expert witnesses were protected with a combination of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 45(b) and FRCP 26(c).  Virginia G. Maurer, Compelling
the Expert Witness: Fairness and Utility Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ,
19 GA. L. REV. 71, 88-89 (1984).
9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra  note 4, § 2463, at 70 nn.17-18.
10 Id.
11 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(ii).
12 Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7911, at *8-9.
13 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(iii); Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7911, at *9.
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able to show that he has been oppressed by having continually
to testify.14
Currently, in applying this balancing test, courts are required to
balance the needs of the litigants with the burden on the expert
witness.
In an attempt to apply the 1991 advisory committee notes for
the amendments to Rule 45,15 this Comment will first examine
the copyrightability of an expert witness’s testimony through a
discussion of the Feist  fact/expression dichotomy.  Second, it will
discuss whether the testimony can be considered property other
than through copyright law.  Third, it will discuss how to apply
traditional Fifth Amendment takings analysis to the taking of in-
tellectual property.  Finally, this Comment will provide a recom-
mendation for courts in handling this scenario in the future.
I
FEIST: FACT OR EXPRESSION
Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution
allows Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”16
The three major subject areas that have arisen under this clause
are copyrights, patents, and trademarks.  In each of these subject
areas there is an underlying theme that not all intellectual prop-
erty is eligible for constitutional protection.  In patent law, no
inventor may secure a monopoly over a natural phenomenon or
a scientific principle.17  Trademark law prohibits any protection
14 Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7911, at *9 (quoting Schering v.
Amgen, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13452, at *8-9 (D. Del. 1998)); see also FED. R.
CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s note (citing Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 822
(2d Cir. 1976)).
15 The specific note of the advisory committee in question here is: “Arguably the
compulsion to testify can be regarded as a ‘taking’ of intellectual property.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(b)(ii) advisory committee’s note.
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 120 (1854).  In O’Reilly , one of Samuel Morse’s
claims in his patent for the telegraph was at issue. Id.  at 112.  Morse attempted to
patent any means by which electricity was used to create a letter at a distance. Id.  at
120.  The Court found that this was tantamount to a patent on electricity as an elec-
tromotive force. Id.  Patent law does not allow for an inventor to patent a natural
phenomenon such as electricity. Id.  In explaining this proposition, it is said that
Albert Einstein could not have secured a patent in his famous equation, E=MC2.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
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for a mark that is either generic or entirely functional.18  Further-
more, no copyright shall be issued to protect the underlying facts
of the work; only the expression is protected.19
The testimony provided by an expert witness is most analogous
to a copyrightable work.  Patents and trademarks, though vital to
intellectual property jurisprudence, do not lend themselves well
to describe an opinion of an expert witness.20  This section, there-
fore, will discuss expert witness testimony in light of copyright
law.  The critical aspect of copyright law, as it relates to the pro-
position that compelled testimony of an expert amounts to a tak-
ing, is the fact/expression dichotomy.  For if the expert’s
testimony is merely factual, no traditional intellectual property
interest is vested in the witness and no taking can occur.  The
fact/expression dichotomy is best outlined in the Supreme Court
decision Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co .21
A. Feist Background
In Feist , the plaintiff was the local telephone company for a
portion of northwestern Kansas.22  Kansas law required that each
sanctioned monopolistic telephone company provide a white
pages phone book.23  The plaintiff provided the white pages to its
clientele free of charge.24  The lucrative endeavor in the making
of phone books is the yellow pages.25  In the yellow pages, the
phone company sells advertisements to local merchants vying for
18 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (1976):
[N]o matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term has
poured into promoting the sale of its merchandise and what success it has
achieved in securing public identification, it cannot deprive competing
manufacturers of the product of the right to call an article by its name.
19 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1991) (“The
most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that ‘no author may copyright his ideas
or the facts he narrates.’”) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation En-
ters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)).
20 A patent issues to a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or compo-
sition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”  35 U.S.C. § 101
(2000).  “The term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof . . . [used] . . . to identify and distinguish . . . goods, including a
unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.”  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
21 499 U.S. at 340.
22 Id.  at 342.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
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the business of the local residents.26
In an attempt to garner market share in the yellow pages in-
dustry, the defendant, which was not a state-sanctioned phone
company, wished to create its own set of white and yellow
pages.27  The defendant planned to have a larger listing, covering
the territory of eleven different phone companies.28  At first, the
defendant contacted each of the eleven phone companies to
work out a license agreement to use the listings in the existing
white pages.29  All of the eleven phone companies entered into
an agreement except for the plaintiff.30  Ultimately, the defen-
dant used a portion of the plaintiff’s listings without a license
agreement, and the plaintiff filed suit.31
At trial, summary judgment was entered for the plaintiff with
the district court citing myriad lower court decisions holding that
telephone directories are copyrightable.32  In an unpublished
opinion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision for “‘substan-
tially the same reasons given by the district court.’”33  The Su-
preme Court reversed, setting forth conclusively the
constitutional mandate of originality in copyrights.
B. Sweat of the Brow
The constitutional mandate of originality, however, was not
ubiquitous prior to Feist .  An exception to the requirement ex-
isted in some jurisdictions as a result of erroneous interpretation
of the 1909 Copyright Act.34  The 1909 Act expressly listed cate-
gories that were amenable to copyright protection.35  One of the
listed categories was compilations.36  Some courts felt that com-
pilations were per se  copyrightable because the category was
listed by the statute.37  A common rationale for this rule was that
the copyright was a reward for the hard work involved in compil-
26 Id.
27 Id.  at 342-43.
28 Id.  at 343.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.  at 344.
33 Id.
34 Id.  at 352.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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ing the facts.38  This rationale came to be known as the Sweat of
the Brow doctrine.39
C. Constitutional Mandate of Originality
“The sine qua non  of copyright is originality.”40  To be original,
a work must be independently created and have a minimum de-
gree of creativity.41  Congress’ power to create copyright law is
derived from Article I, section 8, clause 8.42  From this clause, the
terms “author” and “writings” are the basis for the originality
requirement.  In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony , the
Court defined author as “he to whom anything owes its origin;
originator; maker.”43  In The Trade-Mark Cases , the Court de-
clared that “[t]he writings which are to be protected are the fruits
of intellectual labor , embodied in the form of books, prints, en-
gravings, and the like.”44
From these definitions, the fact/expression dichotomy is appar-
ent.  An author cannot secure a copyright in facts because facts
do not owe their existence to the author.45  This distinction was
particularly important in Feist  because phonebooks, as a compi-
lation, are collections of facts.  The Court held that compilations
are copyrightable, but the copyright exists based on the selection,
coordination, and arrangement of the facts.46  The plaintiff’s al-
phabetical arrangement of phone listings did not demonstrate the
minimal creativity required to secure a copyright.47  The defen-
dant had extended sufficient effort to make the directory useful,
but not enough to make it original.48  In fact, the Court stated
that if this directory were copyrightable, it would be virtually im-
possible to think of a compilation that would fail to receive pro-
tection.49  Though the plaintiff expended great effort to produce
the white pages directory, copyright law is designed to reward
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.  at 345.
41 Id.
42 Id.  at 346.
43 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
44 The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
45 Feist , 499 U.S. at 347.
46 Id.  at 348.
47 Id.  at 362-63.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 364.
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originality, not effort.50  No matter how original the format, the
underlying facts are never copyrightable.51
D. Intersection of Feist and  Kaufman
Kaufman v. Edelstein  was decided in 1976, predating the Su-
preme Court’s 1991 Feist  decision by fifteen years.  It seems
clear, from the non-exclusive five-factor list, that the majority of
the factors tend to ensure that testimony is available for litiga-
tion.  Only the first factor, “the degree to which the expert is
being called because of his knowledge of facts relevant to the
case rather than in order to give opinion testimony,”52 really
takes account of the nature of the expert’s testimony.  For this
reason, courts should expend considerable effort to assess the na-
ture of the expert’s testimony, including assessing its
copyrightability.
The very use of an expert witness’s testimony—to aid the trier
of fact in understanding the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue53—precariously places the opinion into fact/expression con-
siderations.  For this reason, the first step in assessing an expert
witness’s testimony should be a Feist  inquiry into whether the
testimony will be merely a recitation of facts or the witness’s own
expression.  If the testimony is inseparable from the facts upon
which it is built, no copyrightable interest would vest in the ex-
pert.54  In this case, the witness should be compelled to give his
testimony, and the traditional duty to testify will suffice as a ra-
tionale.  If, however, the expression of the witness’s opinion dis-
plays the modicum of originality constitutionally required for
copyrightability, the court should be wary of compelling the un-
retained witness to divulge this testimony.  This is the sentiment
outlined in the advisory committee notes to the 1991 amendment
of Rule 45.  The inquiry into the copyrightability of work, how-
ever, cannot end here.
In addition to the requirements outlined in Feist , a work is
50 Id.
51 Id.  at 349.
52 Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 822 (1976).
53 FED. R. EVID. 702.
54 This concept is known as the merger doctrine.  CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v.
MacLean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 68 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is also well
established that, in order to protect the immunity of ideas from private ownership,
when the expression is essential to the statement of the idea, the expression also will
be unprotected, so as to insure free public access to the discussion of the idea.”).
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copyrightable if it is an “original work[ ] of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later devel-
oped, from which [it] can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.”55  A work is fixed when its “embodiment in a copy . . . is
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, re-
produced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration.”56
When an expert is retained by a party to testify at trial, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) requires the submission of a
written statement, signed by the expert witness, containing all the
opinions to be expressed.57  Certainly a public court document
would meet the criteria of fixation outlined in 17 U.S.C. § 101.
This notion, however, gives rise to a fundamental policy question
in copyright law.  Works created by the government, including
judicial opinions, are not copyrightable.58  In this case, the ques-
tion is whether copyright protection should be extended to the
legal documents that become components of non-copyrightable
judicial opinions.  There are undoubtedly strong arguments for
both sides.  As it relates to the question at hand, however, the
issue is moot because, unfortunately for the unretained expert
witness, Rule 26(a)(2)(B) only applies to retained  witnesses.59
The unretained expert must, therefore, seek to fix his work
independently.
Traditionally, getting a copyright would also require that the
expert’s work meet notice, registration, and deposit require-
ments.60  Presently, United States copyright law does not require
that a work be registered or have notice, but provides significant
advantages to authors that do so.61  Attorneys’ fees, for example,
are only available to the author that registers his work with the
Copyright Office,62 while a work containing notice precludes the
55 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
56 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
57 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
58 CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW § 2.03[B] (6th ed. 2003).
59 FED. R. EVID. 705 cmt.
60 Prior to the enactment of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
the Copyright Act of 1976 required that an author provide notice of copyright, regis-
ter the copyright, and deposit copies of the work with the Copyright Office. JOYCE,
supra note 58, § 6.03, at 449-50.
61 Id.  § 6.03 at 450.
62 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2000).
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use of the innocent infringement defense.63  An expert witness
whom is being compelled to provide testimony would therefore
be well served by fixing his opinions in writing and registering
them with the Copyright Office.64  This way, the expert witness
can secure a valid property interest in his work and use this as a
foundation for argument against compulsion.
Furthermore, the law allows the licensing of the rights vested
in copyrights.  If an expert were able to secure a copyright in the
expression of his testimony, use of the expression in a judicial
proceeding could be granted through a non-exclusive license.  By
using licensing principles, authors would be able to retain more
control over their works (much like software companies).  Simi-
larly, the copyright statute currently has six instances of compul-
sory licenses.65  Normally, a license can only be obtained through
negotiations with the author, and prices are controlled by the
market.66  With a compulsory license, however, no permission is
needed from the author so long as the user pays the royalties
established by the statute.67  Perhaps a system of compulsory li-
censing could be utilized for providing expert testimony as well.
A real dilemma, however, is present if an expert witness regis-
ters his work with the Copyright Office.  Records deposited with
the Copyright Office are made public.  Therefore, if the expert
registers and deposits a copy of the work with the Copyright Of-
fice, the party seeking to compel the expert’s testimony would be
able to gather the information freely, that is, without paying li-
censing fees.  This is the exact situation the expert witness is
seeking to avoid.  To prevent this from happening, the expert
could request “special relief” from the Copyright Office.68  If
special relief is granted, the expert may be excused from having
his work made publicly available.69
It may be too kind to say, however, that the United States’
63 17 U.S.C. § 401(d) (2000).
64 There is a nonrefundable filing fee required to register a work with the Copy-
right Office. JOYCE, supra  note 58, § 6.03[B], at 458.  Therefore, the expert should
balance the value of the testimony with the cost of registering the work.
65 Id.  § 7.01[C] at 487.  They are: The Cable Television License, The Digital Per-
formance Right in Sound Recordings License, The Mechanical License, The Public
Broadcasting License, The General Satellite Retransmission License, and The Lo-
cal-to-Local Satellite Retransmission License. Id .
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(e) (2001).
69 Id . § 202.19(e)(1)(i).
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copyright law is complex.  It is unlikely that an unretained expert
witness will be savvy enough in copyright jurisprudence to iden-
tify without the aid of an attorney the benefits conferred through
a registered and published copyright.  The expert, however, may
be reluctant to spend money on an attorney, fearing an imminent
monetary loss if compelled to testify.  The results are unfortu-
nately cyclical; if the expert decides not to hire an attorney, he
may proceed unaware of any benefits conferred by copyright law.
If he hires an attorney too late, the author will be statutorily pre-
cluded from an award of attorney’s fees.  Furthermore, a request
for special relief is by no means guaranteed.  An expert may be
denied special relief and be back at square one even after hiring
an attorney.
The second classification in the Kaufman  balancing test, “the
difference between testifying to a previously formed or expressed
opinion and forming a new one,”70 considers the extent to which
the expert had to prepare in order to give the testimony but as-
sumes that the testimony is opinion and not fact.  This considera-
tion is at odds, however, with the teachings of Feist .  In assessing
this factor, it would appear that courts are being asked to give
credence to the amount of labor an expert has expended in order
to provide the testimony.  The plain reading of the factor would
indicate that an expert who had to prepare the testimony anew
should be given more protection than an expert who had previ-
ously created their opinion.  This is eerily familiar to the sweat of
the brow rationale that was explicitly rejected in Feist .  Perhaps
the best use for this consideration is in determining the value of
the testimony given, not whether testimony should be given at
all.
The final three factors in the Kaufman  balancing test all speak
to the availability of the testimony.  These factors include the
uniqueness of the witness, the likelihood that another witness
will testify, and the number of times the witness has previously
been asked to testify.71  These considerations do nothing to help
expert witnesses protect their information.  Rather, they help en-
sure that neither the interested party, nor the expert witness, is
burdened by the court’s decision.  Though important, these fac-
tors do not get to the underlying issue of whether the expert wit-
70 Kaufman v. Edelstein , 539 F.2d 811, 822 (1976).
71 Id.
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ness has a valid property interest in the testimony being
compelled as mentioned in the advisory committee’s notes.
It is obvious from the foregoing discussion that copyright juris-
prudence does not lend itself perfectly to addressing compulsion
of unretained expert testimony.  It is unrealistic to think that
each expert witness will obtain a copyright in his opinion.  Fur-
thermore, there are inherent difficulties in obtaining a copyright
in oral testimony; the fixation requirement is one such problem.
That said, the underlying copyright theory is useful in under-
standing the property interest an unretained expert has in his in-
formation.  If no copyright is available, however, does this mean
that there is no relief for the unretained expert witness?
II
INFORMATION IS PROPERTY
The drafters of the United States Constitution were influenced
by the Enlightenment.72  This influence led to an intellectual
property tradition that resisted recognizing a property interest in
information.73  The drafters felt that the dissemination of infor-
mation and ideas was essential to the creation of a free society.74
Recently, however, these notions have been disregarded, and in-
formation has been deemed property.75
Though the outright declaration that information is property is
recent, the underlying notion is not new.  In 1918, the Supreme
72 Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter
Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law? , 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365,
365 (1989).
73 Id.
74 This sentiment was expressed by Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California :
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State
was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government
the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.  They valued lib-
erty both as an end and as a means.  They believed liberty to be the secret
of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty.  They believed that
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispen-
sable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech
and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doc-
trine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental princi-
ple of the American government.
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
75 See  Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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Court recognized a quasi-property interest in news information.76
In International News Service v. Associated Press (“INS”), the
defendant was reporting news it gathered from the plaintiff’s
early edition newspaper and news office bulletin boards.77  In de-
ciding the case, the Supreme Court’s opinion weaved an argu-
ment between unfair competition and property interests.78
Ultimately, the Court stated that news had all the attributes nec-
essary to be considered property.79  The news did, however, have
some characteristics that precluded it from being categorized as
property entirely.80  The news was unique in that the property
interest only lasted up until the publication of the newspaper.81
Similarly, any person that purchased a newspaper was free to
make use of the news thereafter.82  This and other characteristics
led the Court to classify the news as quasi-property.83  Though
INS  is best known as the “unfair competition case,” it did lay the
groundwork for a shift in United States intellectual property
jurisprudence.84
A. Ruckelshaus Background
Sixty-six years after deciding INS , the Supreme Court was
again faced with the question of intangible property interests;
this time, state sanctioned trade secrets were at issue.85  In Ruck-
elshaus v. Monsanto Co. , Monsanto challenged the constitution-
ality of several provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act of 1947 (“FIFRA”).86  FIFRA was initially
a licensing and labeling statute that required all pesticides to be
registered with the Secretary of Agriculture before being sold in
interstate or foreign commerce.87  Any entity seeking to register
a pesticide was required to submit certain safety data to the Sec-
retary of Agriculture.88  This version of the law prohibited the
76 Samuelson, supra  note 72, at 388 (citing Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press,
248 U.S. 236 (1918)).
77 Samuelson, supra  note 72, at 388.
78 Id.
79 Id.  at 390.
80 Id.  at 391.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.  at 388.
85 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 998-99 (1984).
86 Id.  at 990.
87 Id.  at 991.
88 Id.
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Department of Agriculture from disseminating any information
regarding the formulas of the products.89  The Act was silent
about any such restriction on the safety information, but it was
admitted that no such information was dispersed.90
In 1970, the FIFRA responsibilities were transferred from the
Secretary of Agriculture to the newly created Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”).91  Thereafter, Congress revised
FIFRA and created the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control
Act of 1972.92  As amended, FIFRA required the EPA to deter-
mine that each registered pesticide did not cause “‘unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment.’”93  In addition, the 1972
amendments allowed submitting parties to designate portions of
the data as trade secrets or commercial or financial informa-
tion.94  The EPA was not allowed to disclose any such informa-
tion without the consent of the submitting party.95
One means by which the EPA made information public was by
comparing new applicant data with existing registered pesticides
during the application process.96  If similarities existed between
the two pesticides, the EPA would institute a mandatory licens-
ing scheme.97  The EPA was not, however, permitted to use any
information designated as a trade secret in this process.98  Unfor-
tunately, the relevant statutory terms were not clear and myriad
litigation ensued.99
To correct for the inadequacies of the legislation, Congress
amended the statue again in 1978.100  The amendments created
limited monopolies on the use and disclosure of submitted
data.101  The applicant would receive a ten-year monopoly for
any data submitted after September 30, 1978.102  Any data sub-
mitted between December 31, 1969 and September 30, 1978
could be cited in the consideration of subsequent applications for
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.  at 992 (quoting 86 Stat. 980).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.  at 992-93.
99 Id.  at 993.
100 Id.  at 993-94.
101 Id.  at 994.
102 Id.
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fifteen years after the initial submission, but only if the subse-
quent applicant offered to compensate the initial submitter.103
Arbitration would be used to determine a price if one could not
be agreed upon.104  All other data could be used without
limitation.105
B. Trade Secrets Are Property
Monsanto argued that the required submission of its data to
the EPA effected a taking of property without just compensation
in violation of the Fifth Amendment.106  In assessing the argu-
ment, the Court first had to determine whether Monsanto’s trade
secrets were property.107  First, the Court noted that trade secrets
have many similarities with tangible property: trade secrets are
assignable and they can form the res of a trust and pass to trust-
ees in bankruptcy.108  Second, in the very statute at issue, Con-
gress stated that submitters had a legal ownership of their
data.109  Similarly, the Court quoted Blackstone in finding that
the “perception of trade secrets as property is consonant with a
notion of ‘property’ that extends beyond land and tangible goods
and includes the products of an individual’s ‘labour and inven-
tion.’”110  Third, the Court cited precedent in which it had found
other intangible interests to be property.111  Ultimately, the
Court held “that to the extent that Monsanto has an interest in
its health, safety, and environmental data cognizable as a trade-
secret property right under Missouri law, that property right is
protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”112
It is important to note that trade secrets are unlike the other
major categories of intellectual property in that they are prima-
rily concerned with keeping information out of the public forum.
The constitutional foundation of patents and copyrights is to en-
rich the foundation of knowledge so that others may build upon
103 Id.
104 Id.  at 994-95.
105 Id.  at 995.
106 Id.  at 998-99.
107 Id.  at 1000.
108 Id.  at 1002.
109 Id.
110 Id.  at 1002-03 (citing 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 405; see J. LOCKE,
THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, ch. 5 (J. Gough ed. 1947)).
111 Id.  at 1003.  The court had previously found that materialmen’s liens, real es-
tate liens, and contracts were property within the meaning of the Takings Clause.
112 Id.  at 1003-04.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-2\ORE206.txt unknown Seq: 15 18-FEB-05 10:51
Compulsory Testimony of an Unretained Expert Witness 777
it.  Trade secrets, however, do just the opposite.  A trade secret is
kept so that one person (or more likely, one corporation) can
benefit commercially from his knowledge.  Essentially, the public
is at the mercy of the trade secret holder to obtain the benefits of
the information.
The important similarity, however, is that the underlying
theme in intellectual property, copyrights, patents, and trade
secrets alike is a legally protected interest in information.  In fact,
it is exactly the divergence in the purposes of trade secrets as
compared to copyrights and patents that so strongly supports a
property interest in information.  If it were not the information
that was protected, why would trade secrets be protected at all?
Copyrights and patents have constitutional foundations; trade
secrets do not.  The fact that property rights are found in patents
and copyrights—as well as trade secrets, which are completely
opposite in purpose—is evidence that the underlying information
is the source of the property interest in all three.  It is only infor-
mation that links all three subjects and since all three areas are
property, the genesis of the property interest must be rooted in
the underlying information.
C. Carpenter Background
Three years later, in a decision that cited INS  and Ruckel-
shaus , the Supreme Court held definitively that information is
property.113  In Carpenter v. United States , the defendants were
convicted of violating the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, vio-
lating the federal mail and wire fraud statutes, and conspiracy.114
R. Foster Winans was a writer for the Wall Street Journal (“Jour-
nal”).115  At the Journal, Winans was the author of a column
called “Heard on the Street.”116  The weekly column provided
insight on certain stocks and was well respected in the investment
community.117  It was so well respected that after publication it
had a noticeable effect on the value of the stocks reviewed.118
After observing the effect on the reviewed stocks, Winans en-
tered into an investment scheme with his roommate, Carpenter,
and Brant and Felis, two brokers from the Kidder Peabody bro-
113 See  Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987).
114 Id.  at 20-22.
115 Id.  at 22.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.  at 22-23.
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kerage firm in New York City.119  The idea was to provide the
brokers with the column’s information prior to publication.120
By providing the information early, the brokers could buy or sell
the stocks depending on the effect the column would have.121
All the proceeds of the scheme were to be split among the four
participants.122  Eventually, the brokerage firm noticed a correla-
tion between the broker’s purchases and the column and began
to investigate.123  The Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) also investigated the matter.124  After initial denials of
impropriety, the relationship between the conspirators broke
down, and Carpenter and Winans went to the SEC and confessed
the entire scheme.125
D. Information Is Definitely Property
At trial, the district court convicted the defendants, finding
that they had knowingly misappropriated prepublication infor-
mation.126  The defendants appealed and the court of appeals af-
firmed, finding that Winans had misappropriated property within
the meaning of the mail and wire fraud statutes.127  The defend-
ants appealed to the Supreme Court and argued that they could
not have violated the mail and wire fraud statutes because their
activities did not obtain money or property, which is a necessary
element of the crime.128  The defendants argued that information
is an intangible interest that does not amount to property.129
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that information is
property and affirming the convictions.130  Specifically, the Court
held that “the object of the scheme was to take the Journal’s con-
fidential business information—the publication schedule and
contents of the ‘Heard’ column—and its intangible nature does
not make it any less ‘property’ protected by the mail and wire
119 Id.  at 23.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.  at 23-24.
127 Id.  at 24.
128 Id.  at 25.
129 Id.
130 Id.
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fraud statutes.”131  Furthermore, the Court found that the Jour-
nal had been deprived of its right to the exclusive use of the in-
formation and that exclusivity is an important aspect of a
property right.132
E. Expert Testimony Is Information, Expert Testimony
Is Property
In light of the holdings of Ruckelshaus  and Carpenter , it is dif-
ficult to imagine a scenario in which a witness’s expert testimony
is not property.  The purpose of the expert’s testimony is to im-
part information to the trier of fact.  According to Federal Rule
of Evidence 702, the expert’s testimony is used to assist the trier
of fact in understanding the evidence or determining an issue of
fact.133  It is true that the expert’s information is intangible.  The
teachings of Ruckelshaus  and Carpenter , however, make clear
that property interests do not exist exclusively in tangible forms.
Furthermore, compelling an expert to testify deprives the ex-
pert of his right to the exclusive use of his information, one of the
most important “sticks in the bundle” of property rights.134  Just
as this deprivation amounted to a violation of a property interest
in Carpenter , it should be considered similarly when an expert
witness is forced to testify.  Whether a delinquent employee is
misusing the company’s information or a court is forcing an ex-
pert to testify, no exclusivity exists because an entity other than
the owner is using the property.
Just as Monsanto had an interest in its safety data, and the
Journal had an interest in its pre-publication information, an ex-
pert has an interest in his expertise.  In fact, an expert may be
more reliant on his information than either Monsanto or the
Journal.  In Ruckelshaus  and Carpenter , the interested parties
were large corporations, each with diverse holdings.  Had a prop-
erty interest not  been found in either case, the party could have
relied on other aspects of its business for economic support.  Ex-
perts, however, are often skilled exclusively in a distinct area, ei-
ther by “knowledge, skill, experience, training or education.”135
If they are compelled to divulge their hard-earned information
131 Id.
132 Id.  at 26-27.
133 FED. R. EVID. 702.
134 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
135 FED. R. EVID. 702.
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without compensation, their knowledge has been robbed of its
value.  Who pays for information that can be obtained for free?
Unlike the institutional parties, these subject-area experts may
have no other resources on which to rely.
Information has been definitively classified as property by the
Supreme Court.  Expert testimony is information and, therefore,
is property.  This should be given great weight when courts are
utilizing the Kaufman  balancing test.  It is no longer a balancing
of a burden on the expert with the need to have competent testi-
mony at trial.  Now, courts must balance the expert’s property
interest with the need for competent testimony.  A property in-
terest should counsel more deference from the courts than
merely a question of burden.  If the doctrine of stare decisis  does
not require courts to follow the holdings in Ruckelshaus  and Car-
penter  in this manner, the policy argument discussed in the pre-
ceding paragraph should persuade the courts to be more willing
to protect the interests of unretained expert witnesses.
It is precisely from the juxtaposition of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and Supreme Court precedent that the potential bene-
fit for a compulsory licensing scheme is apparent.  The courts will
want to follow the teachings of the Supreme Court in respecting
the property rights of the expert witnesses.  Similarly, the courts
will be tempted to compel the testimony of the experts in order
to elucidate the issues for the trier of fact.  A compulsory licens-
ing scheme may help to alleviate the conflicting nature of these
rules of law by securing both payment for the experts and testi-
mony for the litigants.  This, however, is fodder for the legisla-
ture.  Currently, courts still need to assess whether their actions
amount to a taking of an unretained expert witness’s property.
III
IS THERE A FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKING?
After determining that information is property, or finding that
the expert has a valid copyright, an inquiry must follow as to
whether a taking occurs through the compulsion of an unretained
expert witness’s testimony.  The first step in this process is to de-
termine which variation of takings analysis is appropriate to ap-
ply: physical takings, regulatory takings, or an exaction.
Guidance for this determination can be found in Ruckelshaus .  A
brief description of the three takings varieties, however, is
beneficial.
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A. Physical Invasion Takings
A physical invasion occurs when “a governmental entity exer-
cises its eminent domain powers or acts in an ‘enterprise capac-
ity, where it takes unto itself private resources and uses them for
the common good.’”136  A physical invasion was the type of tak-
ing that occurred in both Kaiser Aetna v. United States  and
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp .137  In Kaiser
Aetna , the defendants leased a large portion of land on the island
of Oahu in the state of Hawaii.138  A lake existed on a portion of
the defendant’s leased land that covered 523 acres.139  The lake
was separated from Maunalua Bay and the Pacific Ocean by a
narrow barrier island.140  The defendants leased the land in order
to build a housing community.141
Part of the development included building a boat docking fa-
cility in the lake for the residents to use.142  To facilitate this use,
the defendant dredged the lake to an average depth of six feet,
increased the clearance of a local bridge between the lake and
the bay to thirteen-and-one-half feet, and made a passageway
through the barrier island.143  All of these changes would make
the bay and ocean accessible to the new residents of the develop-
ment.144  The defendant submitted its plan to the Army Corp of
Engineers and, with one comment regarding beach erosion, was
allowed to proceed.145
After the defendant finished the work and opened the lake to
the use of its residents, the United States informed the defendant
that the lake was now a navigable waterway under the control of
the United States and could no longer be used exclusively by the
defendant.146  Ultimately, the United States sued Kaiser Aetna in
136 Bormann v. Kossuth County Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 317 (Iowa
1998) (quoting JOHN W. SHONKWILER & TERRY MORGAN, LAND USE LITIGATION
§ 1.02, at 6 (1986)).
137 Kaiser Aetna , 444 U.S. at 164; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
138 Kaiser Aetna , 444 U.S. at 166-67.
139 Id.  at 166.
140 Id.
141 Id.  at 167.
142 Id.  at 167-68.
143 Id.
144 Id.  at 167.
145 Id.
146 Id.  at 168.
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the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii.147  At
trial, the district court found that the water was indeed navigable,
but if the government wanted it to be open to the public, the
government would have to pay reasonable compensation.148  The
government appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court’s ruling regarding the payment of compensation.149  The
defendant appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that
the government’s plan to allow for public use of the lake would
directly curtail the defendant’s right to exclude others from its
property.150  The situation may have been different, however, if
the government had attempted to regulate the use of the lake
prior to approving the defendant’s work.151  By not doing so,
however, the defendant came to rely on the fact that its private
property would remain private in the future.152  The defendant’s
reliance on the Army Corp of Engineers’ statements preserved
its right to exclude.153  The public, with the aid of the govern-
ment, would be physically invading the defendant’s privately
owned marina, and the government could not possibly facilitate
this invasion without paying just compensation.154
In Loretto , a decision citing Kaiser Aetna , the plaintiff pur-
chased a five-story apartment building in New York City.155  Af-
ter purchasing the building, the plaintiff noticed that a series of
cable wires and boxes had been installed on the building.156  The
boxes were connected by bolts to the roof of the building and the
wires, connected by masonry nails or screws, ran across the top of
the building and down to the first floor.157  Prior to 1973, the de-
fendant cable television company had to obtain authorization
from building owners before installing any equipment.158  The
wires in this case were installed with the authorization of the pre-
147 Id.  at 168-69.
148 Id.  at 169.
149 Id.
150 Id.  at 179-80.
151 Id.  at 179.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.  at 180
155 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
156 Id.  at 424.
157 Id.  at 422.
158 Id.  at 423.
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vious owner.159  After 1973, however, the installation of cable tel-
evision hardware was facilitated by a New York state law.160  The
law protected the installation of cable television hardware from
interference by landlords, to ensure that everyone had access to
the service.161  The plaintiff filed a class action suit on behalf of
all the real property owners in the state.162  In her complaint, the
plaintiff alleged that the cable television installation was a tres-
pass and, insofar as it was done with the blessings of state law,
was an unconstitutional taking of private property under the
Fifth Amendment.163
At trial, the court granted summary judgment for the defend-
ants, upholding the state law.164  The plaintiff appealed, and the
New York Court of Appeals affirmed, over dissent, that the stat-
ute was constitutional.165  The plaintiff appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, where this decision was reversed.166  The
Court found error in the use of a balancing test, holding that
when the government authorizes a permanent physical invasion
of private property, it amounts to a taking, regardless of the gov-
ernment’s interest.167  Furthermore, the Court stated that the
owner of property suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger
occupies the property.168  The long-standing premise in property
jurisprudence is that the owner has an expectation to remain rel-
atively undisturbed in the possession of property.169  The Court
went on to say that requiring an owner to “permit another to
exercise complete dominion [over the property] literally adds in-
sult to injury.”170
B. Regulatory Takings
There are two categories of takings that require compensation
without any inquiry of additional factors.171  The first is a perma-
159 Id.  at 421-22.
160 Id.  at 423.
161 Id.
162 Id.  at 424.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.  at 425-26.
167 Id.  at 425-26.
168 Id.  at 436.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Borman v. Kossuth County Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Iowa
1998).
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nent physical invasion, such as in Kaiser Aetna  and Loretto  de-
scribed above.  The second is a regulation that denies the owner
all economically beneficial or productive use of the property.172
The quintessential example is in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council .173
In Lucas , the Court held that it was beyond the purview of
historical state land regulation to enact laws rendering an
owner’s property valueless, unless it could be shown that the
owner’s interest was invalid to begin with.174  The plaintiff in Lu-
cas  purchased two plots of land on South Carolina’s Isle of
Palms.175  In an effort to enforce the Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1972, the South Carolina Coastal Council enacted the
Beach Front Management Act.176  The effect of this enactment
prohibited the plaintiff from constructing any habitable struc-
tures on his two plots of land.177  At trial, the state court found
that this regulation rendered the plaintiff’s land “valueless.”178
The Court declared that for South Carolina to avoid compensat-
ing the plaintiff it must demonstrate that, through background
principles of nuisance and property law, the use the plaintiff
seeks to enjoy is prohibited regardless.179
If neither a physical invasion nor a complete diminution in
value has occurred, a balancing test, outlined by Justice Brennan
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City , must be
employed to weigh the juxtaposed interests of the property
owner and the state.180  The Court has admitted, however, that
no distinct standard has been found to address the balancing and
each case depends on its own particular circumstances.181  The
balancing test is described in three parts: 1) the character of the
governmental action; 2) its economic impact; and 3) the interfer-
ence with reasonable investment-backed expectations.182
Generally, the regulations that create questions of Fifth
172 Id.
173 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
174 Id.  at 1027.
175 Id.  at 1006-07.
176 Id.  at 1007.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.  at 1031.
180 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
181 Id.  at 123-24.
182 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (citing Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. , 438 U.S. at 124).
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Amendment takings have their genesis in the legislative branch.
This is not exclusively the case, however.  In Stevens v. City of
Cannon Beach , the plaintiffs purchased property on the Oregon
coast in 1957.183  In 1989, the plaintiffs submitted a building per-
mit application to enable the construction of a seawall on the dry
sand portion of their beach.184  The permit was denied, and the
plaintiff filed suit against the defendants, the City of Cannon
Beach and the State of Oregon.185  The trial court dismissed the
claim, saying that the plaintiffs never had the right to obstruct the
public from access to the beach.186  Both the court of appeals and
the Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed.187  The plaintiff ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court, but certiorari was
denied.188  In his opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari,
Justice Scalia made clear the point that courts too can effect an
unconstitutional regulatory taking.189
C. Exactions
Exaction is the process whereby the state conditions a benefit,
such as a building permit, on the grant of a property interest to
the public by the landowner.  In Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission , the plaintiffs owned a 504-square-foot bungalow on
a piece of land in Ventura County, California.190  After years of
renting the bungalow to vacationers, the property fell into disre-
pair.191  The plaintiffs wanted to knock down the bungalow and
build a new house on the land.192  They submitted a building per-
mit application to the defendant in order to proceed.193  The de-
fendant, however, refused to approve the permit unless the
plaintiffs granted a lateral easement for public use across a sea-
ward portion of their land.194
After myriad proceedings, a hearing was held that found the
183 Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1207 (1994) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting from denial of cert .).
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.  at 1334 (“No more by judicial decree than by legislative fiat may a State
transform private property into public property without compensation.”).
190 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987).
191 Id.
192 Id.  at 828.
193 Id.
194 Id.
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new house would block the public’s view of the beach and con-
tribute to a psychological barrier to the beach.195  The defendant
again conditioned the approval of the building permit on the ex-
action of the easement.196  The plaintiffs objected and filed suit in
the superior court.197  The superior court agreed with the plain-
tiffs and struck the condition.198  The defendant appealed to the
California Court of Appeals, but before the appeal was com-
plete, the plaintiffs had the house built.199  The court of appeals
reversed the superior court and the plaintiffs appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.200
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the easement condition was
found to be a taking.201  An easement that laterally traversed the
seaward side of the property would not have any ameliorating
effect on the defendant’s stated interest.202  That interest was
preventing the psychological barrier to the beach.203  Since the
easement would not do anything to enhance the public’s view of
the ocean, the requisite “essential nexus” between the harm and
the exaction did not exist.204
The decision in Nollan , however, left an important question
unanswered: “[W]hat is the required degree of connection be-
tween the exactions imposed by the city and the projected im-
pacts of the proposed development[?]”205  This question was
resolved when the Court decided Dolan v. City of Tigard .206  In
Dolan , the plaintiff was the owner of a plumbing supply store in
the defendant city.207  She filed an application with the city to
receive a permit to increase the size of her store and build a
paved parking lot.208  Instead of granting the permit outright, the
defendant conditioned the permit on the granting of an easement
to the city in the land that was within the 100-year floodplain of
195 Id.
196 Id.  at 829.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.  at 829-30.
200 Id.  at 830-31.
201 Id.  at 841-42.
202 Id.  at 836.
203 Id.
204 Id.  at 837.
205 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377 (1994).
206 Id.
207 Id.  at 379.
208 Id.
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the nearby creek, for the purpose of a public greenway.209  In
addition, the city required a fifteen-foot strip of land outside of
the floodplain be reserved for the construction of a foot/bike
path.210
In challenging the city’s requests, the plaintiff exhausted her
administrative remedies and ultimately appealed through the Or-
egon Court of Appeals and Oregon Supreme Court to the
United States Supreme Court.211  The plaintiff alleged that the
city’s demands amounted to an impermissible taking of her prop-
erty under the Fifth Amendment.212  The plaintiff admitted that
the city was permitted to condition her permit on the granting of
some property rights to the city.213  The plaintiff’s complaint,
however, was that the city had not sufficiently made a showing to
justify the exactions in this case.214  The plaintiff argued that
more than meeting the essential nexus test was required to pro-
tect the state from liability under the Fifth Amendment.
The Court held that in addition to meeting the essential nexus
test, the state must also meet a “rough proportionality” test.215
That is, the “city must make some sort of individualized determi-
nation that the required dedication is related both in nature and
extent to the impact of the proposed development.”216  In assess-
ing the facts at hand, the Court found that a private greenway
could just as easily solve the flood problem.217  Furthermore, the
city did not meet its burden of establishing that the additional
bicycle and automobile traffic, caused by the larger store, would
be enough to justify a public path through the plaintiff’s
property.218
D. Regulatory Taking Is Best Suited for Compelled
Expert Testimony
In the case of a court’s compelling an unretained expert to tes-
tify, the best-suited takings analysis is regulatory takings.  First,
the intangible nature of the information makes the concept of
209 Id.  at 380.
210 Id.
211 Id.  at 382-83.
212 Id.  at 383.
213 Id.  at 385-86.
214 Id.
215 Id.  at 391.
216 Id.
217 Id.  at 393.
218 Id.  at 395.
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physical invasion an impossible exercise in metaphysics.  Second,
it is unlikely that the expert’s information would be rendered val-
ueless after being compelled.  The expert will still retain all of the
information even if the unlikely scenario occurred in which the
imparting of his knowledge to the court would confer the same
expertise on those listening.219  To that end, the expert will only
have lost the profits associated with providing the compelled tes-
timony, but he can still utilize his information in other situa-
tions.220  Finally, exaction analysis is misplaced in this context.
The court is not conditioning a benefit for the expert witness on
the witness’s willingness to provide expert testimony.
Further evidence that regulatory takings analysis is the appro-
priate means to use is that the Supreme Court utilized this
219 Thomas Jefferson eloquently described this principle when he wrote:
Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late in the progress of
society.  It would be curious then, if an idea, the fugitive fermentation of an
individual brain, could, of natural right, be claimed in exclusive and stable
property.  If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others
of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea,
which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to him-
self; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of
every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it.  Its peculiar
character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other pos-
sesses the whole of it.  He who receives an idea from me, receives instruc-
tion himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine,
receives light without darkening me.  That ideas should freely spread from
one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man,
and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and be-
nevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible
over all space, without lessening their density in any point, and like the air
in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of con-
finement or exclusive appropriation.  Inventions then cannot, in nature, be
a subject of property. Society may give an exclusive right to the profits
arising from them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may
produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to the will and
convenience of the society, without claim or complaint from any body.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8 n.2 (1966) (quoting VI WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 180-81 (Washington ed., 1903)).
220 This seems to be at odds with my previous statement that the expert witness
cannot rely on other interests such as an institutional party.  The difference is that
institutions are making money through other means concurrently with the informa-
tion that they have lost.  The expert can only be in one place at a time; if he is in
court they are not making money elsewhere and have lost the opportunity to do so.
It is similar to the concept of being a “lost volume seller” in contract jurisprudence.
To that end, this statement is only made to determine which takings analysis is best
suited to address the possible taking.  This differentiates only between the takings
methods utilized and does not affect the expert witness’s right to compensation in
one form or another.
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method in Ruckelshaus .221  There, the Court found that the ques-
tion hinged on the “reasonable investment-backed expectations”
factor outlined in Penn Central .222  Based on the changes in
FIFRA, described in detail above, the Court identified three dis-
tinct time periods in which the investment-backed expectations
required analysis.223  The first was for all the data submitted to
the EPA after the 1978 amendments.224  The second was for the
data submitted to the government prior to the 1972 amend-
ments.225  The third was for the data submitted in the time be-
tween the 1972 amendments and the 1978 amendments.226
In the first instance, the Court found that Monsanto was fully
aware of the conditions for submitting the data.227  A ten-year
monopoly was established and Monsanto could not reasonably
have any investment-backed expectations beyond those limits.228
Accordingly, no taking was effected by the regulation.229  For the
time prior to the 1972 amendments, the statute was silent on the
question of how the EPA could utilize submitted data.230  The
industry, however, had long been the subject of public concern,
and it was likely that the EPA could find disclosure of such infor-
mation in the public’s interest.231  The lack of any guarantee re-
garding the confidentiality of any data submitted and the public
concern over the industry meant that no reasonable investment-
backed expectation could exist in submitting the information
during this time period.232
The situation was different, however, for the data submitted
between 1972 and 1978.233  During this time period, applicants
were given the option to designate certain information as a trade
221 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984).
222 Id.
223 Id.  at 1005-10.
224 Id.  at 1006.
225 Id.  at 1008.
226 Id.  at 1010.
227 Id.  at 1006.
228 Id.  at 1006-07.
229 Id.  at 1007.  Thus, as long as Monsanto is aware of the conditions under which
the data are submitted, and the conditions are rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernment interest, a voluntary submission of data by an applicant in exchange for the
economic advantages of a registration can hardly be called a taking. Id .
230 Id.  at 1008.
231 Id.  at 1008-09.
232 Id.  at 1009.
233 Id.  at 1010.
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secret.234  Under this version of FIFRA, the EPA was precluded
from disclosing information designated as a trade secret.235  This
iteration of the statute provided a reasonable basis for Monsanto
to understand that the confidentiality of the information would
be maintained.236  The submissions, therefore, were accompanied
with a “reasonable investment-backed expectation” that Mon-
santo would retain “control over the use and dissemination of the
data it had submitted.”237
In the case of an unretained expert witness, it is reasonable for
him to have an expectation, backed by investment, that he alone
has the exclusive right to use and disseminate his information.  In
the case of an expert who is so designated because of his educa-
tion, it is unlikely that the expert paid for his education for the
altruistic purpose of ensuring justice in litigation.  In other words,
the expert did not complete his education in order to provide
competent expert testimony.  Rather, the expert gained his edu-
cation in order to provide for himself, or at the very least to gain
intellectual stimulation.  In any case, it is hardly true that the ex-
pert expected to provide his services for free on demand.  Similar
justifications can be given for experts so designated for their
knowledge, skill, experience, and training.
In assessing another of the Penn Central  factors, the nature of
the government action is extremely severe.  First, court orders
are government actions that can amount to a regulatory ac-
tion.238  The compelled expert witness does not have a realistic
choice of options.  The expert is faced with an order from a fed-
eral court commanding that he appear and divulge his hard-
earned information.  If an expert decides to disobey the court
order, he will face either a criminal or civil contempt charge.
Considering that contempt charges can carry a prison sentence, it
is hard to imagine a more severe form of government action.
Similarly, in the vein of the final Penn Central  factor, deter-
mining the economic impact of compelled testimony is not be-
yond the abilities of the courts.  It is likely that data exists to
determine fees that have been charged for similar testimony in
the past.  The expert may also be able to provide data regarding
234 Id.
235 Id.  at 1011.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 See supra  notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
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the fees charged in other engagements requiring the dispensation
of the same or similar opinions.
Information has been deemed property and, therefore, it is
possible to be taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  In
short, the balancing test outlined in Penn Central  is well suited to
assess takings claims regarding intellectual property.  The nature
of any investment-backed expectation is discoverable, the extent
of the governmental action has the potential to be severe, and
the economic impact of compelling expert testimony is readily
obtainable.
IV
RECOMMENDATIONS
As early as the 1950s, the United States was a worldwide
leader in the export of intellectual property.239  By the early
1980s, the United States was the world’s largest exporter of intel-
lectual property.240  These developments were the impetus for
the United States to join the Berne Convention in 1989.241  By
joining the Berne Convention, the United States ensured protec-
tion for its authors’ copyrights in all of the member nations.242
One immediate effect was copyright protection in two dozen
countries with which the United States did not previously have
intellectual property treaties.243  Undoubtedly, the United States
recognized the inherent value of intellectual property and made
these changes to protect its valuable assets.
Pamela Samuelson warned that a new attitude in the law’s rec-
ognition of property rights in intellectual property may be upon
us.244  Her warning came in 1989, and fifteen years later it now
seems that this premonition has come true.  Many of today’s
wealthiest people are in the business of information.245  Congress
has recognized this trend and changed copyright laws to protect
239 JOYCE, supra  note 58, § 1.04[B][2], at 32.
240 Id.  § 1.04[C][1], at 36.
241 Id.  § 1.04[B][3], at 33 (“The Berne Convention is administered by the World
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), an intergovernmental organization
with headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland.  WIPO is a specialized agency within the
United Nations system.  Its central role is to conduct studies and provide services
designed to facilitate protection of intellectual property.”). Id .
242 Id.  § 1.04[C][1], at 36.
243 Id.
244 Samuelson, supra  note 72, at 395.
245 Three of Forbes’ “World’s Richest People” made their fortunes in software
technology: Bill Gates and Paul Allen of Microsoft, and Lawrence Ellison of Oracle.
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these valuable assets accordingly.246  Now it is time for the courts
to make this same recognition and protect unretained expert wit-
nesses from being compelled to testify under Rule 45.
When deciding whether to compel an expert’s testimony, the
courts are guided by assessing the copyrightability of the expert’s
work.  In so doing, analyzing the issue from the perspective of
the Feist  fact/expression dichotomy will aid the courts in deter-
mining if the issue is one of fact, appropriate for compelling, or
an issue of opinion in which a copyrightable property interest ex-
ists.  If the courts are able to locate a copyright property interest,
serious consideration must be given against compelling the testi-
mony without compensation.  Analyzing the issue in terms of
copyrights helps to identify property interests in intangible intel-
lectual works.  Similarly, a court may be more willing to recog-
nize a copyright property interest if it is hesitant to recognize
information as property in following Ruckelshaus  and Carpenter .
In addition, copyright jurisprudence may be beneficial in sup-
plying a model for the licensing of expert witness testimony.  Ex-
pert witnesses should retain the right to bargain for the use of
their services, as the advisory committee notes suggest.  There
are situations, however, where the expert witness will lack bar-
gaining power or the need for the testimony will be so great that
the temptation to compel the witness will be unbearable.  In
these situations, a system of compulsory licensing may be benefi-
cial to protect both the property interests of the expert witnesses
and the litigants’ right to competent testimony at trial.  The
teachings of copyright law will be instrumental in administering
any such compulsory licensing scheme.
If no copyrightable interest can be found in the expert’s testi-
mony, however, a property interest may still be present.  It is pre-
cisely the holdings of Ruckelshaus  and Carpenter  that give rise to
this interest.  The Supreme Court has unequivocally held, twice,
that information is property.  Federal courts are bound by this
precedent and must recognize this property interest in the infor-
mation sought to be compelled from an expert through Rule 45.
After recognizing a property interest in an expert’s testimony,
Forbes.com, World’s Richest People 2003, at  http://www.forbes.com/2003/02/26/ bil-
lionaireland.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2005).
246 JOYCE, supra  note 58, § 5.01[B][1], at 342 (“On October 27, 1998, President
Clinton signed into law the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (Title I,
Pub. L. No. 105-298) extending the basic term of protection to life-plus-70 years.”).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-2\ORE206.txt unknown Seq: 31 18-FEB-05 10:51
Compulsory Testimony of an Unretained Expert Witness 793
courts should find guidance for compensation questions in the
traditional Penn Central  regulatory takings analysis.  In complet-
ing the analysis, courts should seek to determine the economic
impact of compelling the testimony.  Similarly, the nature of a
court order compelling a witness to testify should be considered.
Finally, courts should assess the reasonable investment-backed
expectations, if any, that exist in the expert.  After completing
this analysis, courts should be able to determine if compelling the
expert would amount to a taking.  Furthermore, this analysis
should have the added benefit of determining reasonable com-
pensation that may be owed to an expert forced to testify under
Rule 45(c)(3)(B)(iii).
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, an expert witness should never be forced to di-
vulge his information without compensation.  The discretionary
language of Rule 45(c)(3)(B)(ii) should be modified from may  to
shall  to match that of Rule 45(c)(3)(A).  As the advisory com-
mittee’s notes to the 1991 amendment of Rule 45 suggest, forcing
an expert to testify amounts to a taking of his property.  The
holdings in Ruckelshaus  and Carpenter  make this clear.  Analyz-
ing the question of compulsion in light of Feist  will aid courts in
determining whether the desired information is factual or expres-
sive.  In the former, compulsion does not reach the Fifth Amend-
ment takings question.  In the latter, however, courts must
recognize the property interest that has become the bedrock of
the United States economy and must order just compensation.
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